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sell2 5 to the effect that the issuance of the turnover order has no proba-
tive value in the contempt proceedings. But it is held that the turn-
over order, once established by the trustee in bankruptcy, puts the
burden upon the bankrupt to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
he is physically unable to comply with that order.26 He cannot at-
tack the validity of the turnover order, but he can meet the burden
imposed upon him by the issuance of that order with evidence showing
that he is not now in possession of the property and thus incapable of
complying. The bankrupt is not bound to the showing of happenings
since the issuance of the order making him unable to comply, in order to
escape imprisonment, unless the court issuing the turnover order fol-
lowed the rule of the Oriel case that the evidence should be "dear and
convincing" 27 before the order can issue, and in the majority of cases
the courts will have adhered to that rule. However, when the order
upon its face indicates that the court did not issue it upon "clear and
convincing" evidence, but rather because of an inflexible rule of law
which they feel constrained to follow because of precedent,28 the Su-
preme Court cannot justifiably continue the unreasonable presumption
that the bankrupt has in his possession the goods and can comply
with the order when such is obviously not the fact. This was not the
intent of the Oriel case but would be rather a perversion of the rule
there established, which rule must be applied by the court only when
the circumstances warrant.2 9
DANIEL D. RancwrN.
Discovery-Inspection of Chattels
In a recent case,1 the plaintiff sued a bottling company for damages
for an illness allegedly resulting from the consumption of part of a
bottled drink containing a deleterious substance. Before trial, the
defendant requested that the plaintiff allow it to have a chemical analysis
made of the remaining contents of the bottle. Plaintiff refused, and
the defendant moved that he be required to deposit the bottle with the
clerk of court so as to permit an analysis to be made. The trial court
denied the motion. In affirming, the South Carolifia Supreme Court
held: There is no statutory authorization for requiring a party to pro-
20 In re Elias, 240 Fed. 448 (E.D. N.C. 1917). 5 REmINGTO , BANKRVFT
§2428 (4th ed. 1936).
, Power v. Fuhrman, 220 Fed. 787 (C.C.A. 9th 1915).
, See note 14 supra.
'" Other circuits limit the presumption of continued possession according to
circumstances. Brune v. Fraidin, 149 F. 2d 325 (C.C.A. 4th 1945), 31 VA. L.
REv. 938, affirming 55 F. Supp. 129 (D.C. Md. 1944), 31 VA. L. REv. 204.
s In 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 789 (1947) the decision of the circuit court of appeals
in committing the bankrupt for contempt is strongly condemned.
'Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S. C. 516, 46 S.E. 2d 147 (1948).
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duce and permit inspection of chattels in his posession, and the court
possesses no inherent power to grant such relief.
In regard to the discovery of evidence within a party's possession
or knowledge, the early common law courts laid down the rule that
no one is required to furnish evidence to his adversary.2 This rule
worked a great hardship on litigants when a part or all of their evidence
lay exclusively within the knowledge .or possession of their opponent.
Chancery, to prevent this injustice, ahd in the exercise of its inherent
power to probe the consciences of fhe suitors, developed the bill of
discovery.3 By means of this bill, a party could require his adversary
to give evidence under oath, or to produce papers and documents in his
control or possession. 4 The evidence thus procured could then be
used in an action at law. However, one could obtain only evidence ma-
terial to his own case or defense, and not evidence material only to his
opponent's case. 5 And the rule of privilege applied. 6 Under the same
bill, chancery allowed the inspection of chattels in a party's possession
or control when the administration of justice required.
7
Inspection of chattels has been allowed under a bill of discovery in
the United States.8 It has also been allowed incidentally in suits for
relief in equity.9 Under the codes, some cases have allowed inspection
of chattels on the theory that the courts possess inherent power to
grant such relief.10 Other cases have denied inspection for the reason
I Union P. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1890); Dell v. Taylor, 6 Dowl.
& R. 388 (1825); 3 BL. Comm. *381, 382; 6 WIGmooE EVmENCE §1862 (3rd ed.
1940).
'People exr rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927);
1 Po MEoY, EQUITY JuRispRuDEFNCE §190a (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
'1 POMEROY, EQUITY JuRIsPRuDENcE §190a (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
'Carpenter v. Wynn, 221 U. S. 533, 54 (1910); Combe v. London, 4 Y. &
C. 139, 160 Eng. Rep. 953 (1840) ; Hunt v. Hewitt, 7 Exch. 236, 155 Eng. Rep.
953 (1852).
'Re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E. 2d 492 (1936); Calcraft v. Guest,
[1898] 1 Q.B. 759, 78 L.T. (N.S.) 283; 1 'PoaERoY, EQUITY JURISPRuDENcE
§203 (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
7 Marsden v. Panshall, 1 Vern. 403, 23 Eng. Rep. 548 (1686) (inspection of
pawned clothes allowed under bill of discovery to enable plaintiff to bring action
at law); Earl of Macclesfield v. Davis, 3 Ves. & B. 16, 35 Eng. Rep. 385 (1814)
(inspection of heirlooms ordered in suit in chancery); 6 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§1862 (3rd ed. 1940).
'Reynolds v. Burgess Sulfite Fibre Co., 71 N.H. 332, 51 Atl. 1075 (1902)
(inspection of broken strap alleged to have caused injury allowed under bill of
discovery to enable plaintiff to prepare case at law).
. 'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Griesa, 156 Fed. 398 (C.C. Kan. 1907) (exhumation
and examination of body of deceased ordered in suit to cancel insurance policy) ;
Diamond Match Co. v. Oshkosh Match Works, 63 Fed. 984 (C.C. Wis. 1894)
(inspection ordered in suit to enjoin patent infringement); McLeod Tire Corp.
v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 268 Fed. 205 (S.D. N.Y. 1920) (inspection ordered in
patent infringement suit); Rowell v. William Koehl Co., 194 Fed. 446 (W.D.
N.Y. 1912).
"E.g., Arkansas Utilities Co. v. Pipkin, 202 Ark. 314, 150 S.W. 2d 38 (1941)
(inspection of equipment and safety appliances on premises) ; Clark v. Tulare Lake
Dredging Co., 14 Cal. App. 414, 112 Pac. 564 (1910) (inspection of machinery
on barge allowed); Sinclair Oil Refining Co. v. Nat. L. McGuire Oil & Supply
19481
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that they lacked such power."
No case involving inspection of chattels has been reported in North
Carolina. The legislature has abolished the bill of discovery,12 and
provided a statutory substitute. 13 No provision is made for inspection
of chattels. However, it seems that the statute merely substitutes a
simplified procedure for the bill, and does not affect the inherent power
of the court in its equitable jurisdiction to do justice between the
parties.14 This conclusion is supported by Flythe v. The Eastern Caro-
li-na Coach Co.,' 5 in which the supreme court held that a trial court
has inherent power to order a physical examination of a plaintiff in a
personal injury action when it finds that justice to the defendant re-
quires it, even though there is no statutory authorization.
There would seem to be little, if any, reason for a distinction be-
tween the power to order an inspection of chattels, and the power to
order an inspection of documents which was inherent in equity. Each
is a species of personal property. The property rights invaded by an
inspection of chattels do not differ in kind or degree from those in-
vaded by an inspection of documents.' 6 Such an inspection may be as
necessary to the administration of justice as an inspection of documents
Co.,-- Mo. App.- , 221 S.W. 378 (1920) (defendant allowed to inspect
to see how much oil plaintiff had on hand and its value) ; State ex rel. American
Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 270 Mo. 533, 194 S.W. 268 (1917) (inspection allowed
of machinery and premises); Driver v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 58 Ohio App. 299,
16 N.E. 2d 548 (1938) (discovery of tube of mascara allowed in order to have it
analyzed).
"1 E.g., Martin v. Elliot, 106 Mich. 130, 63 N.W. 998 (1895); Wilson v Col-
lins, 57 Misc. 365,- 109 N. Y. Supp. 662 (1908) ; Downes v. McAleen, 16 N. Y.
Supp. 916 (City Court of New York 1891); Cook v. The Lalance Grojean Mfg.
Co., 3 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 332, 29 Hun. 641 (1883). See cases collected in 33
A. L. R. 16.
"2N C. GEN. STAT. §1-568 (1943) (No action to obtain a discovery under
oath in aid of the prosecution or defense of another action shall be allowed, nor
shall any examination of a party be had on behalf of the adverse party, except
in the manner prescribed by this article.). Query: Does this statute abolish all
discovery, or merely that seeking testimony of a party under oath? Its terms
are limited to examination of parties under oath, with no mention of discovery
of documents which is provided for in another article, nor of discovery or chat-
tels, but the court seems to have interpreted it as abolishing the bill of discovery
completely. See Dunn v. Johnson, 115 N.C. 249, 20 S.E. 390 (1894).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-570 and §1-571 (examination of parties); §8-89, and
§8-90 (inspection of books, papers, and documents).
"'Dunn v. Johnson, 115 N. C. 249, 20 S. E. 390 (1894) ; MCINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTIc AND PROCEDURE §86 (1929); 1 Pom-Eaoy, EQuiY Juass-
PRUDENCE §194 (5th ed., Symonds, 1941).
"' 195 N. C. 777, 143 S.E. 865 (1928); accord, Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Hill,
90 Ala. 71. 8 So. 90 (189Q); Johnson v. Southern P. R.R., 150 Cal. 535, 89
Pac. 348 (1907); United R. & E. Co. v. Cloman, 107 Md. 690, 69 Atl. 379
(1908); Hess v. Lake Shore & M. S. R.R., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 565 (1882); Wanek
v. Winona, 78 Minn. 98, 80 N.W. 851 (1899); Carnine v. Tibbetts, 158 Ore.
21, 74 P. 2d 974 (1937). Contra: Union Pacific R.R. v. 'Botsford, 141 U. S. 250,
(1890) (Rule 35 of the Fed. R_ Civ. Proc. (1938) now authorizes orders for
.1hysical examinations of parties); Howland v. Beck, 56 F. 2d 35 (C.C.A. 9th
1932); Yazoo & M. V. R.R. v. Robinson, 107 Miss. 192, 65 So. 241 (1914);
Richardson v. Nelson, 221 Ill. 254, 27 N.E. 583 (1906).
"Reynolds v. Burgess Sulfite Fibre Co., 71 N. H. 332, 51 At]. 1075 (1902).
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or the physical examination of a party. It would be an illogical situa-
tion if one could obtain a physical examination of his injured opponent
and yet not be allowed to inspect the chattel alleged to have caused
the injury.'7
Therefore it appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court would
be justified in extending the right of inspection to chattels in a proper
case. The procedure for obtaining such an inspection would seem to
be that approved for physical examinations in the Flythe case, i.e., by
a motion that the court order the party to allow the inspection.
The South Carolina decision is explainable in the light of another
case' 8 holding that the court has no power in absence of statute to
order a physical examination of a party, although the analogy is not
infallible.
A few states have provided for inspection of chattels in their statutes
or rules regulating discovery. 19 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
incorporate inspection of chattels into the liberal provisions for inspec-
tion of papers, documents, and premises.
2 0
Since other phases of discovery are provided for by statute in North
Carolina, 2 . it would seem desirable that inspection of chattels be so
provided for. In the interest of obtaining uniformity of practice be-
tween the state and Federal courts, as well as to settle any doubt as
to the power of the court to order an inspection of chattels, it is sug-
gested that an adoption by the legislature of the provisions of Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be in order.
22
CHARLES DEXTER POWERS.
17Arkansas Utilities Co. v. Pipkin, 202 Ark. 314, 150 S.W. 2d 38 (1941)
(in which the court said that the power to order inspection of machinery was no
different from the power to order an examination of the person).18Easier v. Southern Ry., 60 S.C. 117, 38 S.E. 258 (1901).
"Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
"Rule 34: Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the courts in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection, and copying or photographing, by 'or on behalf of the moving party
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26
(b) .and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (2) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession
or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property or any designated object or operation thereon within the scope of
the examination permitted by Rule 26(b). The order shall specify the time,
place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
"Excepting, of course, physical examinations of parties.
"Arizona and Colorado have adopted Rule 34 of the Fed. R. Clv. Proc. as it
stood before amendment in 1947. See Aiuz. CoaE ANN. §21-736 (1939), and
Colo. R. Civ. Proc. (1941) Rule 34.
